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1 The present paper was prepared for the discussion panel What do we expect from
constitutionalism? that took place on the 30 September, 2006, in Helsinki. As such, its only
aim was to focus discussion and its style has remained that of a panel presentation: it is brief
and provocative and contains almost no references. A similar albeit more complete argument
may be found in Besson 2006. I would like to thank all participants in the panel for a lively
and thought-provoking discussion and in particular Joxerramon Bengoetxea, Bardo
Fassbender, Miguel Maduro and Kaarlo Tuori. The ideas presented in this short paper were
developed within the framework of the Project for a European Philosophy of European Law
(PEOPEL, http://fns.unifr.ch/peopel).
2 In short, I will take the concept of (formal) constitution to refer to a superior legal
norm which is usually but not always laid down in a written document, which constitutes and
defines the powers of the main organs of the different branches of government and which is
in principle protected through specific revision rules against modification by an ulterior law,
over which it therefore has priority. As to the concept of constitutionalism, it will be used to
refer to the political conception according to which political and legal power can only be
exercised within the limits of the constitution, such as the separation of powers, checks and
balances, the rule of law, democracy or fundamental rights. On the many controversial
meanings of both concepts, see Besson 2006, section I.1.
THE CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTION IN
EUROPE: INTERPRETATION IN LIEU OF
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Samantha Besson
What do we expect from constitutionalism? The question raised by the panel’sorganisers is an important one.1 What  should  we  expect  now,  after  we
expected so much from a European Constitution with a big ‘C’ and that nothing seems
to have changed? Was it after all a misconceived quest? In fact, the question has been
made even more interesting by the addition of the term ‘expectation’ at the beginning
of the question raised: (i) why should one be said to expect anything from concepts like
‘constitution’ and ‘constitutionalism’2 in Europe and (ii) who is the ‘we’?
My concern in this short paper will concentrate more on the conceptual issues
relative to our expectations from European constitutionalism, than to their substantive
content. As a matter of fact, if certain conceptual issues had been clarified before, there
are reasons to believe that the more substantive ones might also have become clearer
sooner. As I have argued elsewhere (see Besson 2007), constitutional pluralism, i.e.,
the co-existence of many ultimate constitutional norms of different origins within the
same European legal order lato sensu (see Walker 2002), needs to be matched by a
pluralism of mechanisms to vest the latter with democratic legitimacy. If I am right that
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3 I am assuming, of course, that the terms ‘constitution’ and ‘constitutionalism’ are
not used to refer to other concepts than those usually referred to by those terms in national
law. Not only would this kind of talking at cross purposes be highly unlikely in a well
established academic discourse, but the intentional differential use of such highly connotated
normative terms would be counterproductive; why use this heavily loaded term to refer to
something normatively less pregnant? See Besson 2006.
4 It suffices to mention the case-law of the German Federal Constitutional Court and
in particular BVerfGE 37, 271 – Solange I, BVerfGE 73, 339 - Solange II, and BVerfGE 89,
155 – Brunner. See also most recently, Bananenurteil BVerfGE 102, 147, 2 BvR 1/97 and
BVerfGE, 2 BvR 2236/04. See also Kaarlo Tuori in this volume.
this legitimation process requires de-territorialisation, then conceptions of constitution
and constitutionalism themselves need to be de-territorialised. Of course, this has a
heavy theoretical price, but I would like to argue that we should be ready to pay it, if
we want to go forward with European constitutionalism.
As a matter of fact, constitutions and constitutionalism are already largely de-
territorialised or rather over-territorialised in Europe. For a long time, the territorial
distribution of constitutions matched the distribution of political and legal sovereignty.
Each political and legal entity had a constitution, and the plurality of conceptions
between those entities seemed perfectly natural. Political and legal globalisation has
changed all this. The Westphalian conception of political sovereignty has started to
fade. Territory and political membership are gradually growing apart, immigration and
the development of post-national citizenship being only two of the many causes or signs
of this decoupling of the political and the legal from the territorial. This has had
implications for the concept of constitution, as well. One speaks, for instance, of the
international constitution to refer to the constitutional structure and fundamental
principles of the international community.3 Closer to us, European citizens are still
wondering about the future of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe which
some have affectionately called the ‘European Constitution’. What this means is that
constitutions, and thus political and legal orders, now overlap in the same territory and
pertaining to the same population, thus jeopardising traditional political and legal
conceptions of the constitution. The unitary conception of the constitution, for instance,
according to which there is one single constitution per political entity and territory, is
questioned by the fact of European constitutional pluralism. So is the conception
according to which constitutions are necessarily the ultimate or fundamental legal
norms in a legal order. After all, for a long time, neither the supremacy of international
law nor the primacy of EU law had managed to entirely undermine the idea that
national constitutions retained an ultimate validity.4 Recent years’ post-national
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5 See Besson 2006, section I on the translation of the concepts of constitution and
constitutionalism in the EU context. See also Walker 2004; Walker 2002; Craig 2001. For
different approaches, see Shaw 1999; De Witte 2002; Grimm 1995; Habermas 2001; Weiler
2003.
6 See also Kaarlo Tuori in this volume.
constitutional talk and, more importantly, global constitutionalising processes are about
to change all this.
The many constitutions of Europe and their co-existence within the same
European legal order lato sensu raise two sets of issues: issues pertaining to the
constitutional nature of the European Constitution and issues pertaining to the scope
of European constitutional theory. The hiatus between national theories of the
constitution and post-national constitutional law, and hence between the theory and
practice of European constitutional law, constitutes what one may refer to as the double
paradox of theorising European constitutional law and of Europeanising
constitutional theory. While the first issue has been addressed extensively, as the past
few years have seen the development of all sorts of accounts of European and post-
national constitutionalism,5 it is the second issue that I would like to take up in these
few remarks, i.e., the impact of the plurality of constitutions on what we should now
expect from constitutionalism tout court in Europe.
Whatever comes out of the current ratification process of the European
Constitution, constitutional reality has changed drastically in Europe. The new
European Constitution, whichever shape it takes, will apply to the same territories and
populations as national constitutions and become an integral part of national legal
orders. The difficulty is that the conceptions of constitution and constitutionalism
traditionally pertain to a single and unitary norm per legal order and polity, whether the
latter is national or cosmopolitan. Translating them to fit the multi-layered European
political structure is therefore necessary (see Walker 2003).6 But is conceptual
translation pertinent with respect to the concept of constitution, which is traditionally
unitary, and to the pluralistic European legal order lato sensu in which the boundaries
between national and European law stricto sensu can no longer be drawn? In other
words, can we afford to have, in the same legal order, a theory of law and a theory of
the constitution that cannot accommodate conflicting conceptions and uses of the
concept of the constitution and that needs to translate the concept into the European
context every time an issue arises in the latter?
The many European constitutions call for an encompassing
constitutional theory that can explain both national constitutions and the European
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Constitution. What the co-existence of many European constitutions requires in other
words is not only a translation of the concept of constitution in another context, but a
re-interpretation of the concept per se; translation leaves the pre-existing concept
untouched, whereas European constitutionalism clearly puts the concept of constitution
itself in question. Developing an encompassing constitutional theory requires addressing
the two questions delineated at the outset of the paper: (1.) what should one expect from
concepts like constitution and constitutionalism, and (2.) how do these expectations fare
with the plurality of constitutions in Europe?
1. Constitutional theory and conceptual analysis
When they are objects of philosophical study, concepts are taken to be a purely
philosophical creation. They are placed between the world, aspects of which they are
concepts of, and words or phrases, which express those concepts and are used to
discuss those aspects of the world. One usually opposes ‘concepts’ to ‘conceptions’. A
conception amounts to what the concept is more precisely, i.e., a definition or
deployment. Concepts and conceptions are merely different levels at which more or less
concrete statements are made. In a nutshell, it is important to distinguish between an
object, a concept of that object, our concept of that object and our conceptions of that
object.
Legal theory is an explanation of the nature of law. Because the concept of law
is  part  of  people’s  perception  of  the  nature  of  law,  conceptual  analysis  has  been
regarded as a prime method of legal theory. Like legal theory, constitutional theory is
the explanation of the nature of the constitution. As such, one of its prime methods of
inquiry is conceptual analysis and the explanation of the concept of constitution. The
concept of constitution indeed amounts to the way people perceive the constitution and
this has an influence on the explanation of the nature of the constitution itself.
The concepts that matter the most in constitutional theory are normative
concepts that embody a normative standard or value and whose correct use by this very
essence involves value judgments. It is the case of the concept of constitutionalism
itself. Conceptual analysis as applied to the concept of constitutionalism, even though
it is a normative concept, is not necessarily universal and hence constitutional theory
need not necessarily be universal. Some authors argue it is and that the concept of
constitution is the same across the board, while others reject the value of a general
theory of the constitution privileging a theory that applies only to a single legal system.
More and more authors now choose a middle path that combines elements of both
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approaches. Under this alternative, legal theory is both a discussion of the concept of
law in general and focussed on a particular legal system. It looks at a group of legal
rules, but as a means of understanding our own legal system better. According to
Joseph Raz, for instance, the concept of law we investigate is ‘our concept’, the product
of a specific culture. Since what counts as ‘law’ under our concept of law is
independent of that concept, there can be cultures that do not have ‘our concept’, yet
still have ‘law’ and could also have the ‘concept of law’ (see Raz 2004; Raz 2001).
Mutatis mutandis, constitutional theory looks at constitutional systems and the
concept of constitution in general, but as a means to clarify our own conceptions of our
constitutional system. What this implies for constitutional theory is that there can be
a general constitutional theory, although constitutional law varies from country to
country and from period to period in a single country. Constitutional theory can yield
a vague concept of constitution that is not meant to draw borderlines, but to focus
discussion. A good deal of constitutional development is autonomous and internal
constitutional considerations play a large role in constitutional decisions. A theory of
the constitution cannot therefore be derived entirely from extraneous considerations
such as social or economic factors. It abstracts from the possible impact of those social
conditions and provides the theoretical framework within which the effect of diverse
social conditions can be assessed. Constitutional theory can therefore be both normative
and universal, on the one hand, and descriptive and able to accommodate in basic
realities of political life, on the other. What remains to be seen, however, is whether
there can be a constitutional theory that can accommodate the co-existence of many
different constitutions or at least of different conceptions of the constitution within the
same legal order and the same polity.
2. Constitutional pluralism and conceptual unity
While the concept of constitution should allow for a certain amount of conceptual
flexibility across time and place, thus acknowledging the existence of a thick European
Constitution stricto sensu besides national constitutions, difficulties might arise with
the co-existence of conflicting conceptions of the constitution at the same time and
place,  as  in  the  context  of  the  European  legal  order lato sensu.  It  is  indeed  a
consequence of the mixed approach of concepts and conceptual analysis, which was
adopted before, that concepts referring to a particular reality should be applicable
across the board regarding that same reality. In other words, the point of concepts is to
ensure a certain convergence in the reference to the same objects in a linguistic
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community. What this requires is a certain amount of conceptual unity or at least of
conceptual coherence.
A solution to this important challenge to European constitutional theory might
be for national conceptions of constitution and constitutionalism to converge towards
a more integrated conception within the European constitutional order. On this view,
realising constitutional pluralism in Europe implies, first, a revision of traditional
conceptions of national constitutions and constitutional law and, second, although these
two steps are simultaneous, the development of an integrated post-national conception
of constitutions and constitutional law in Europe.
2.1 Revising traditional conceptions of constitution and constitutionalism
As alluded to before, those unitary conceptions, according to which the constitution is
the fundamental and ultimate norm of a legal order, cannot prima facie accommodate
the co-existence of different constitutions in the same legal order. The relationship
between the European Constitution and the national constitutions within the European
legal order lato sensu cannot therefore be explained by reference to those conceptions
of constitution and constitutionalism. Nor can it be clarified by reference to the
international legal order and to its alleged hierarchical relationship to the national legal
order; national and European constitutional norms are deeply interwoven and there is
no absolute hierarchy between them. As such, traditional conceptions are challenged in
their ability to conceive of the new European constitutional order, and, in other words,
to explain constitutional pluralism.
Given the new constitutional reality in Europe, a constitutional theory that
cannot explain national as well as the European constitutions cannot be deemed a
complete constitutional theory. Moreover, national conceptions should not only be able
to account for both the national and the European constitutions in themselves, but they
should also reach a certain level of coherence among themselves as they all account for
the same European constitution in the same European legal order lato sensu with all the
consequences this may have on each other’s national legal orders. A good theory of
European constitutional law should, in other words, be (trans-)European rather than
purely national.
In what follows, I would like to take up some of the conceptions of the
constitution one finds in predominant legal theories, in order to assess their ability to
explain both national and European constitutions and hence to test their resilience when
faced with the European constitutional challenge.
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With respect to legal positivism, first, it has been a common critique that its
conception of law cannot account for the autonomy of a legal order that is as
decentralised and heterarchical as the European legal order. There is indeed no Hartian
rule of recognition or Kelsenian Grundnorm in the European legal order lato sensu, to
take but two of the most important legal positivist theories. Many contemporary legal
positivists argue, however, albeit in different ways, for the possibility to base the
autonomy of both the European constitutional norms and the national constitutional
norms, and hence the co-existence of national and European constitutions within the
same legal order. What is common to both these neo-Hartians and neo-Kelsenians is the
idea of standpoint; conceptions of the national and the European constitutions can
remain unitary, without, however, being in conflict, since what matters in each case is
the perspective of the competent authority, be it national or European. Each authority
will indeed conceive of the European legal order lato sensu in a way that gives the
ultimate competence to its own constitution, and all that matters for conceptual unity
or coherence is that its own conceptions and decisions are coherent in themselves (see,
e.g., MacCormick 1999, Ch. 7; Richmond 1997). The problem is that legal coherence
requires consistency in the European legal order as a whole. As I have explained
elsewhere, national and European authorities are knitting the same legal web whose
subjects are primary European citizens; the latter should be the reference in judging the
coherence of all the legal norms that apply to them (see Besson 2004). If the authority
of national and European law depends on their overall normative coherence, this implies
a responsibility and a duty of cooperation among national and European authorities
active in that order. The need for normative coherence contradicts the absolute
sovereignty of either one’s or the other’s constitution, even if their sovereignty is only
a sovereignty of standpoint and although authorities take turns in exercising it.
As to discourse theory, secondly, its ability to accommodate both national and
European constitutional law seems prima facie higher. Discourse theory does not
indeed foresee any hierarchical order of norms and can accommodate a heterarchical
and de-centralised legal order such as the European constitutional order (see, e.g.,
Habermas 2004; Zürn and Wolf 1999). The hidden premise of discourse theory,
however, is the existence of an ethico-political community of the type we are familiar
with in the national context, in which rights and democracy can be grounded and the
autonomy of the legal order can be socially integrated. This would seem to imply that
until the European Union has turned into a European constitutional super-state, its legal
order will remain incomplete or of a minor quality. In the meantime, the European
Constitution, which is not a global state’s constitution, should draw its legitimacy from
national constitutions, thus emphasising the latter’s democratic and constitutional
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superiority. This approach, which one may refer to as communitarian cosmopolitanism
as opposed to global cosmopolitanism, therefore denies the necessity to revise current
conceptions of national constitutions and to develop a new conception or concept of
European constitutionalism, since both take turns.
As to system theory, finally, the accommodation of the new European
constitutional reality seems even easier, at least prima facie. System theorists’
conception of law is not founded on a hierarchy of norms, but on a function-based
pluralist organisation of clusters of norms (see, e.g., Fischer-Lescano and Teubner
2006; Maher 1998). As such, the co-existence of multiple non-ultimate constitutions
in the European legal order lato sensu can easily be accounted for. The dissociation
between law and politics also eases the recognition of a European constitution without
a European state. One may ask, however, why, in a global and pluralist conception of
law, one should want to recognise an intermediary type of law like European law or
even national law, if all that matters is functionalism and not legitimacy. This objection
is even stronger pertaining to European constitutional norms, both at the national and
European levels, as their raison d’être is not entirely clear in a function-driven
constellation of norms, in which legitimacy is not a concern and where normative
hierarchy is disposable.
2.2 Developing an integrated conception of constitution and constitutionalism
If traditional conceptions of constitutions have to be revised to accommodate
constitutional pluralism and the co-existence in the same legal order of national and
European constitutional norms, then the conceptions of post-national constitutions
themselves should be adapted in order to develop an integrated conception of
constitutionalism in a multilevel legal order. The real challenge stems not only from the
accommodation within traditional conceptions of national and European constitutions,
but of their accommodation together and at the same time. In a nutshell, even if one
recognises the autonomy and co-existence of both the national and the European
constitutions in a national legal order, one needs to explain how they relate. If neither
is supreme, contrary to what would have been the case under traditional conceptions
of the constitution, their potential conflicts need to be addressed. European legal
practice has indeed demonstrated in fifty years of integration how constitutional
conflicts can arise between those constitutional orders. True, these were often due to
outdated unitary conceptions of constitution and constitutionalism and were to a great
extent formal conflicts (of competence), but moral pluralism can lead to substantive
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7 See, e.g., T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation
v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, [2005]
ECR II-3533.
constitutional conflicts in pluralist legal orders as well, thus calling for solutions (see
Besson 2004).
Different authors have tried to provide an account of European constitutional
pluralism and a framework for the relationship among constitutional norms within the
European legal order lato sensu. Scope precludes discussing them in full detail and a
few remarks will suffice. Legal pluralism now prevails over legal monism, which once
was the most widespread conception of the relations between legal orders; it differs
from the latter since, while it acknowledges that different legal orders are intermingled
without transposition of one into the other, it recognises no clear hierarchy between
them. Despite the plurality in its terms, legal pluralism should not, however, be
confused with dualism, whose central take is to entrench a clear separation between
legal orders; this approach has long been belied by invasive forms of international and
European law and by the doctrine of direct effect in particular.
Theories differ, however, as to how to best explain the pluralism of
constitutional orders, while still accounting for constitutional sovereignty in Europe and
hence for the need for legitimate solutions to constitutional conflicts.
Radical pluralists contend that the European constitutional order coexists with
national constitutional orders without any form of subordination between them. In case
of conflict, the only settlement procedures are extra-legal and include moral principles
like coherence, toleration or dialogue (see, e.g., Weiler 2003). One may also mention
content-based or normative (as opposed to formal or wholesale legal) hierarchies such
as binding international norms of jus cogens, as exemplified in the recent constitutional
case-law of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities.7
Soft pluralists, by contrast, contend that the European and national legal orders
coexist and are not subordinated to one another. But they also consider them to be
legally coordinated by rules of international law and international dispute settlement.
One may coin this brand of pluralism as ‘pluralism in monism’, since it condones legal
pluralism in the European legal order but founds it in monism at the international level
(see, e.g., MacCormick 1999, Ch. 7; Richmond 1997). One may legitimately fear,
however, that conflict might escalate and reach those international rules and mediation
courts. Besides, it is not entirely clear why there should be constitutional pluralism in
Europe and not beyond, and hence why the international legal order should remain
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8 See, e.g., Cases T-253/02 Chafiq Ayadi v Council of the European Union,
judgement of 12 July 2006, n.y.r., and T-49/04 Faraj Hassan v Council of the European
Union and Commission of the European Communities, judgement of 12 July 2006, n.y.r.
hierarchically superior to the European and the national one. Evidence from the recent
case-law of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities.8
Whatever the outcome of this debate, it is crucial that constitutional pluralism
in Europe does not lead us to neglect the issue of legitimacy in a pluralist European
constitutional order. The constitutional decisions should be vested with sufficient
legitimacy to justify their claim to authority. Apparent coherence reached through legal
bricolage of the kind suggested by some legal pluralists to date (see, e.g., Fischer-
Lescano and Teubner 2006) does not quite put the legitimacy issue at rest; coherence
amounts to only one of the conditions of legal authority (see Besson 2004). Addressing
the legitimacy issue openly remains difficult, however, since constitutional pluralism
has yet to be matched by a corresponding model of democratic legitimacy; European
democracy remains largely conceived of in a statist fashion and hence in traditional
constitutionalist terms. It is this traditional conception of constitutionalist democracy
that might explain why the constitutionalisation of Europe was perceived as a threat by
a majority of the European population. This makes it all the more urgent therefore to
address the question of the democratic legitimacy of the European legal order by re-
interpreting its constitutive elements in the light of the new political and constitutional
circumstances in Europe (see Besson 2007). Otherwise, democracy will remain its own
worst enemy, clinging to a largely dépassé conception of constitution and
constitutionalism and hence undermining the first steps made towards the
democratisation of European law.
To go back to the question raised at the outset of the paper, high expectations
have been raised by the post-national constitutional discourse and rightly so. The time
has come to face this constitutional revolution, and the fundamental paradigm shift in
the organisation and legitimation processes of the national legal orders in Europe. True,
the constitutional process has come to a halt at the European level, but the ball is now
in the court of Member States where the key to the interpretation of European
constitutionalism and democracy has always lain.
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